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BEST FRIENDS AND RELATIONS:
CONSTRUING "ISSUE" IN INSTRUMENTS
AND INTESTACY STATUTES
George B. Reese*
Donative transfer-the conveyance of property from one owner

to another without consideration-occurs in two general forms. First,
express transfers are those events where an owner (hereinafter "creator") 1 has manifested an intent to make the donative transfer, either
inter vivos or at death, and that intent is given legal effect. This
category includes all sorts of inter vivos gifts, gifts under wills and
other similar testamentary transfers. Second, intestate transfers are
of a more limited variety: ownership of property has ceased because
of the owner's death without effective recognition by the owner of a
donee. In such an event, the property descends to certain relatives of
the decedent designated by the legislature, or absent such relatives,
to the state via escheat.
In New York, in both classes of donative transfer, the intent of
the owner plays a vital role. An express transfer requires a manifes3
tation of the donor's intent. 2 This manifestation, generally speaking,
will be given effect. It follows that, if the express denotation of the
intended donee is ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved, if
*

B.A. Yale University 1970; J.D. Columbia University 1973; Associate Professor, St.
John's University School of Law.
1. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW [hereinafter "EPTL"] § 1-2.2 (McKinney
1981) (defining "creator" as "a person who makes a disposition of property").
2. It is true that delivery is also required to complete a gift inter vivos. See generally In
re Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 176 N.E.2d 395, 217 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1961).
3. A transfer by will must comply with the relevant statute of wills, EPTL § 3-2.1.
There are other restrictions imposed on the choice of donees. The right of election, EPTL § 51.1, sets limits on effective. disinheritance of a surviving spouse. In addition, the provision for
exempt property, EPTL § 5-3.1, requires that certain assets pass to the surviving spouse or, if
none, to surviving minor children. An additional sort of restriction occurs where the legislature
allows a particular sort of gift but requires that it be made in a particular form-regardless of
the donor's intent. See generally E. CLARK, L. LUSKY, A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS,
AND ESTATE GIFr TAXATION

4-64 (3d ed. 1984) (treatment of countervailing public policies).
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possible, by reference to the intention of the donor: the court should
resolve the ambiguity the way the donor would have wished. 4 An
intestate transfer, on the other hand, presents by definition no effective indication of the decedent's intentions. It could be said that an
intestate's testamentary scheme is completely ambiguous. The legislature resolves such ambiguities by apportioning the decedent's property among his next of kin in a manner that the legislature believes
most similarly situated decedents would have chosen. Thus, issue
take to the exclusion of parents and parents take to the exclusion of
grandparents.'
It will be accepted that some of the most common words employed to describe classes of beneficiaries in instruments of donative
transfer and in intestacy statutes - "issue," "descendants," "children," "grandchildren," etc. - are inherently ambiguous. People may
have biological issue that they would not consider issue for the purposes of donative transfer. For example, it seems unlikely that a donor or intestate would wish to favor a child surrendered at birth for
adoption through an agency and never heard from again. On the
other hand, it seems extremely likely that a creator or intestate
would wish to favor certain biological strangers - for example, his or
her own adoptive children. Between these extremes lie fact patterns
made innumerable by the complexities of human relationships.
In the case of an express transfer, any such ambiguity can be
avoided by specific drafting directed either at the particular fact pattern ("I direct that A.B. and his issue shall be considered issue of
mine for the purposes of this instrument") or at a particular general
pattern ("I direct that any person who is not born in wedlock or
thereafter legitimized shall not be considered issue of mine for the
purposes of this instrument"). However, failing such specific address,
each ambiguity of this sort will be resolved either judicially through
a construction proceeding or, more generally, through legislative
mandate. In the case of an intestate transfer where there can be no
specific address, any ambiguity must be resolved either by the legislature speaking on a general level to all similar situations or, failing
4. The New York Court of Appeals has relied on this general proposition as the basic
premise of any construction proceeding. See, e.g., In re Thall, 18 N.Y.2d 186, 219 N.E.2d 397,
273 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1966); In re Fabbri, 2 N.Y.2d 236, 140 N.E.2d 269, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184
(1957).
5. EPTL § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981); see also Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter
"UPC"] §§ 2-101 to 2-106, 8 U.L.A. 56-66 (1983). Of course, the legislature's views may
change over time and there is presently an effort on the part of the Radigan Commission to
revise § 4-1.1. See N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 13, 1990) at 1.
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such resolution, by a court construing the intestacy statute in the

context of the particular fact pattern before it.
It seems certain that these words of class definition found in an
instrument, or in an intestacy statute, barring express contrary defi-

nition or extremely unusual circumstances, 6 must denote marital biological issue. 7 The general question remains, however, whether such
words, employed without express definition, should be construed as
also including nonbiological but adoptive issue ("adopteds in"), biological issue adopted away from the natural family ("adopteds out")

or biological but nonmarital issue ("nonmaritals"). Under present
New York law, it is quite clear that, barring express indication to
the contrary, such terms in instruments and in intestacy law do denote adopteds in and their issue. 8
As to the rights of adopteds out under instruments, In re Best,9
decided by the New York Court of Appeals, created a presumption
that the word "issue" would not include those children adopted out
by complete strangers to the adopted out's natural family.10 Best left
open the question of exclusion if a child is adopted out by family
members (hereinafter "hybrid adoptions"). This question was resolved thereafter by legislation that provided that a gift to issue, lawful issue, children, descendants, heirs, heirs at law, next of kin, distributees or any term of like import would be deemed to include
persons adopted out by certain members of their natural families"
who would have been members of such a class but for the fact of
6. For, after all, the intention of the creator takes precedence over common usage. See
supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
7. This proposition forms the premise underlying EPTL § 1-2.10.
8. EPTL §§ 1-2.10(a)(2), 2-1.3 (a)(l) (McKinney 1981).
9. 66 N.Y.2d 151, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1985), cert. denied sub. nom.,
McCollum v. Reid, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986)[hereinafter Best].
10. Id. at 155, 485 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
11. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW [hereinafter "DRL"] § 117 (McKinney 1988). Thus, In re
Best governs the import of the word "issue" in cases of adopteds out where the adoption is by
strangers and excludes the adopted out from the class gift. DRL §117 governs the import of
the word "issue" and similar words in cases of adopteds out where the adoption is by certain
classes of family members - whether biologically related or related through a prior adoption in
(a hybrid adoption), and includes the adopted out in the class gift. Each sort of adoption by
strangers or hybrid would appear to represent a large fraction of total adoptions in New York.
Leg. Doc. (1985) No. 65(N) 9-10 citing Leg. Doc. (1963) No. 19 App. E. 158-59 (The Second
Report of the Bennett Commission) and Leg. Doc. (1959) No. 44, 9F. In cases where the
adoption is by classes of family members not governed by DRL §117, is would seem likely that
these adopteds out would not be included in class gifts by reason of an expressio unius est
exclusio alternius argument as to the intent of the legislature. However, it can be assumed that
this third class of adopteds out, adopted by family members not within the classes expressly
considered by DRL §117, is numerically small and perhaps insignificant.
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their adoption.
Until recently, adopteds out were removed from their natural
(preadoption) family in cases involving intestacy. The single historical exception to this rule was that an adoption by the spouse of a
parent (stepparent) did not sever the relationship of the child with
the natural parent.12 However, it was believed that this result - the
general exclusion of adopteds out in the case of hybrid adoptions was not in keeping with the presumed intent of a typical decedent. 13
Accordingly, legislation was enacted allowing adopteds out in hybrid
adoptions to appear in both their adoptive and biological family trees
for purposes of intestacy. 1 '
Nonmaritals also create ambiguity in donative transfers. Best
spoke to this group and created a rebuttable presumption that the
word "issue" includes nonmartials when employed on an instrument.1" The New York Legislature has now enacted a bill that
would require this construction for wills and revocable gifts of persons dying on or after September 1, 1991, unless the instrument contained an express provision to the contrary. 6 On the intestacy side,
nonmaritals always take from and through their natural mothers and
from and through their natural fathers given prescribed proofs of
17
paternity.
This article will consider the range of problems raised by the
treatment of nonmaritals and adopteds out in the law of donative
transfer and will also consider New York's legislative response to
such problems. First, although legislation in this area is certainly
well-intentioned, certain criticisms of the relevant statute will be offered. Second, the generally preemptive nature of a legislative solution will be examined and an argument advanced in favor of a more
12. EPTL § 4-1.1; DRL §117 (1)(d) (McKinney 1988) provides:
When a natural or adoptive parent, having lawful custody of a child, marries or
remarries and consents that the step-parent may adopt such child, such consent
shall not relieve the parent so consenting of any parental duty toward such child nor
shall such consent or the order of adoption affect the rights of such consenting
spouse and such adoptive child to inherit from and through each other and the natural and adopted kindred of such consenting spouse.
13. Leg. Doc. (1985) No. 65N, at 33-34.
14. See DRL § 117 (McKinney 1988).
15. 66 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1012, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (1985).
16. EPTL § 2-1.3(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The act also requires this construction
for all lifetime gifts made on or after September 1, 1991. Id. A nonmarital is deemed an
"issue" of a beneficiary under an instrument if the beneficiary is the nonmarital's mother or
the nonmarital's father, given the proofs of paternity prescribed by EPTL § 4-1.2 (McKinney
1981).
17. EPTL § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981).
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flexible approach.
I.

IN RE BEST

In Best, the court construed the will of Jennie Best. The will
was executed in 1973, four months before Mrs. Best's death. Her
will left her residuary estate in trust for Mrs. Best's daughter,
Ardith Reid. 18 Upon the death of Mrs. Reid, the trustees were "to
divide said trust fund into as many shares or parts as there shall be.
. .issue [of Mrs. Reid] . . .and to continue to hold each of such
shares or parts in trust during the life of one of said persons.''9
Anthony Reid, born in 1963, was the sole issue of Ardith's Only
marriage.2 0 However, in 1952 Ardith had given birth to a nonmarital
male child. 2 1 Shortly after that birth, with the knowledge of Mrs.
Best, 2 Ardith surrendered this child for adoption through an agency,
and the adoption records were sealed. 2 After the death of Mrs. Best,
the executors of her will learned of Ardith's nonmarital child.2
Faced with the ambiguity of the word "issue" as used in Mrs. Best's
will in light of the nonmarital child (or issue), the executors felt
compelled to try to make that child a party to their accounting.
Through the efforts of a detective and with the aid of the adoption
agency (but not through the unsealing of the judicial records of the
adoption), they were able to locate the child.2
The dispute, of course, was whether the nonmarital adopted out
child should be included in the class of Ardith's "issue" in Mrs.
Best's will. On the executors' account, the question was theoretical
because the nonmarital adopted out child held only a contingent future interest in the trust (however the will was to be construed, he
would have to survive his natural mother to receive a present income
interest). ,But, on the trustees' account that followed the death of
Mrs. Reid, the question of construction had to be addressed. Should
the nonmarital adopted out child take equally with his marital half18.

In re Best, 116 Misc. 2d 365, 365, 455 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (1982)[hereinafter Best

1].
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
child and
However,
25.

Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 153, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1011, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
Id.
A co-executor was Mrs. Best's brother who knew of the..xistence of the nonmarital
its adoption out. Affidavit of Andrew Ian Cook at 2, Appellant's Appendix at 157.
it does not seem that he prompted Mrs. Reid's disclosure. Appellant's Brief at 4.
Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 366, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 488-89.
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brother, or should he take nothing?
Additionally, was Mrs. Best's intention (actual or presumed) to
include this particular child within her gift or to exclude him? On
previous appeals, each of the three courts which ruled on the point
chose to consider the question as having two separate parts: (1)
should the fact that the child was a nonmarital create a presumption
of exclusion2 6 and (2) should the fact that the child was adopted out
also give rise to such a presumption. The eventual decision of the
New York Court of Appeals purported to give guidance in cases involving nonmaritals who are not adopted out and adopteds out who
are not nonmaritals. To this extent, the opinion goes beyond the significant facts of the Best case.
A.

"Issue" and Nonmarital Children

The Westchester County Surrogate's Court was the first court
to deal with the question of nonmaritals. Surrogate Judge Brewster
relied, in part,28 on the persuasive authority of a first department
case, In re Hoffman.2 9 The court in Hoffman had concluded that the
term "issue," when standing alone in an instrument without "express
qualification," should denote nonmarital as well as marital children."0 The Hoffman conclusion, based partially on judicial perceptions as to present-day mores, 3' reversed a prior and contrary rule of
construction that nonmaritals should not share in a gift of "issue"
without express qualification. 2 Surrogate Judge Brewster, deciding
26. This question had been raised before in open court. See In re Hoffman, 53 A.D.2d
55, 65, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 56 (1st Dep't 1976) ("The word 'issue' should be construed to refer
to legitimate and illegitimate descendants alike in the absence of an express qualification by
the testatrix."); In re Leventritt, 92 Misc. 2d 598, 400 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sur. Ct. 1977) ("children should be construed to exclude nonmarital issue in the case of an instrument drafted later
than 1951 - the date of [the] Hoffman will"). This presents the interesting question of whether
the holding of Best is retroactive or prospective - an issue that was briefed for the court of
appeals but not decided - and, if the latter, from what date?
27. Lower courts have also addressed this question. See In re Hall, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 31,
1985) at 6, Col 2 (N.Y.Co. Sur. Ct.); In re Bissell, 74 Misc. 2d 330, 342 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sur.
Ct. 1973). Cf. In re Heverly, 113 Misc. 2d 925, 450 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sur. Ct. 1981).
28. Best, 116 Misc. 2d at 373, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93.
29. 53 A.D.2d 55, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep't 1976).
30. Id. at 65, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
31. Id. at 57, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
32. Id. at 66-67, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 57. As a common law decision, the Hoffman ruling
would appear to be retroactive. Id. at 65, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 56; see, e.g., In re Gans, 134 Misc.
2d 426, 511 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sur. Ct. 1986). But see In re Leventritt, 92 Misc. 2d 598, 400
N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sur. Ct. 1977). For a discussion of the usual rules regarding retroactivity, see
H. JONES, S. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD: CASES & TEXT MATERIALS 220
(3d ed. 1980).
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in favor of the presumed inclusion of nonmaritals, also made reference to the EPTL definition of "issue" in section 1-2.10, which does
not make any marital-nonmarital distinction."3 The court noted:
"There is no language in the will itself suggesting an intention different from that defined by statute should be given to the word
'issue.' "I"
Finally, the court considered Mrs. Best's was awareness of the
birth of the nonmarital child in 1952.1' She was also aware of the
child's immediate adoption.3 6 The court observed:
The decedent took no action to remove the nonmarital son from her
[1973] will. While she may have been reluctant to acknowledge the
existence of the birth of a nonmarital child to her daughter, an
intent to exclude such child was not written into her will.37 It

could easily have been included in her will by the simple direction
that the bequest to her daughter's issue be limited to "issue of a
lawful marriage" or similar language which would not acknowledge or suggest that there was in fact a nonmarital child. Her failure to state her intention to disinherit the nonmarital child under
the circumstances of her knowledge of the existence and adoption
of such a child overcomes any inference of intent to disinherit
which might arise from the secrecy which she maintained concerning the birth of a nonmarital child to her daughter. 8
The Appellate Division (Second Department) affirmed, per curiam. 39
33. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 373, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493. EPTL §1-2.10 (McKinney 1981)
provides:
(a) Unless a contrary intention is indicated:
(1) Issue are the descendants in any degree from a common ancestor.
(2) The terms "issue" and "descendants" in subparagraph [1] include adopted children.
[There is no paragraph (b)].
Article 1, part 2 of the EPTL provides definitions for a number of terms employed by the
EPTL. It therefore is only applicable to the construction of instruments indirectly, through the
argument that the drafter was probably familiar with the statutory definitions and, if a defined
word was employed, probably intended that it would have the same meaning as it would in the
statute. However, Article I definitions should be contrasted with the provisions of Article 2
which speak directly to instrument construction.
34. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 373-74, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493. Of course, in a construction
case, it is not necessarily relevant how the word should be construed as a matter of statutory
interpretation. See supra note 33.
35. Best 1, 116 Misc. at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. The Appellate Division is the intermediate level appellate court in New York State.
In re Best, 102 A.D.2d 660, 477 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1984). There certainly is some merit
in the summary handling of construction cases by appellate courts. First, evidence of intent
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The court of appeals, on the subsequent appeal, agreed with the
lower courts that the word "issue", when used in an instrument without other indication of the creator's intent, includes nonmarital
children:
Contemporary social mores and constitutional doctrine governing
the rights of children born out of wedlock suggest that drafters now
view the unmodified term issue to refer to children born both in
and out of wedlock [citation omitted], and we now hold this to be a
40
rebuttable rule of construction (emphasis added).
B.

"Issue" and "Adopteds Out"

In dealing with the second aspect of Best, the courts' conclusions differed regarding the question of whether "issue", without further indication of intent, should be construed to include natural children that were adopted out. Surrogate Brewster concluded that
"adopteds out" should be within the class."1 In reaching this result,
he put great weight on Domestic Relations Law ("DRL"), section
117.42 That statute provides that "adopted outs" generally should
not inherit from their natural families in intestacy, but "[tihis section shall apply only to the intestate descent and distribution of real
and personal property and shall not affect the right of any child to
distribution of property under the will . . . or under any inter vivos
trust instrument . . . executed by such natural parent or his or her
kindred . . . .",4The court noted the comment of the framers of this
provision (the Bennett Commission): "This act is also intended to
provide specifically that it does not affect any interest an adopted
child might have under the will or inter vivos instrument of any
member of his natural family. . . ."" The questions at this point
were (1) whether DRL, section 117 was intended to prevent
adopteds out from losing any interest they would have in a class gift
but for the fact of their adoption or, to the contrary, (2) whether the
may border on the intangible, and thus may be more evident to a nisi prius judge than in an
appellate record. Second, as a construction proceeding is a matter, basically, of giving effect to
intent, and intent varies from case to case, an appellate court's detailed explanation of its
decision may paint too broadly beyond the facts before it and its opinion be given excessive
precedential force.
40. Best, 66 N.Y.2d at 154-55, 485 N.E.2d at 1012, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (citation
omitted)(emphasis added).
41. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
42. Id. at 368-70, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 490-91.
43. Id. at 369-70, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
44. Id. at 370, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
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subsection was to insure that adopteds out-by the fact of their
adoption-would not lose gifts presumptably intended by the creator
for them to have regardless of any adoption.
It was clear that DRL, section 117 was intended to strip inheritance rights from the adopted's pre-adoption family only in intestacy. This was accomplished by the first clause of subdivision 2. The
difficulty arose from the second clause, which was either redundant

(and basically meaningless), or created a canon of construction in
favor of including adopteds out, regardless of whether the adoption
was by strangers or by family members.4 5 Surrogate Judge Brewster
took the latter view.4 6 He concluded that an adopted out, whose existence and whereabouts might be protected by sealed records, was
nonetheless presumptively interested in a gift to "issue" and, therefore, was a necessary party ' to a construction or accounting proceeding. He admitted his conclusion would create jurisdictional
problems for fiduciaries.4 8 In his view, however, these problems resulted from "the failure of the legislature by its choice of language
in framing DRL, section 117 to totally sever the rights of adopted
out children to inherit . . . from or through its natural or biological
parents." 49 Surrogate Brewster also admitted that his construction of
DRL, section 117 would promote the violation of the secrecy that
45. There are difficulties with both positions. If the clause is redundant, why does it
speak only to interests created by "natural parents or their natural or adopted kindred" as
opposed to interests created by any creator? Of course, natural parents and their kindred
would be those most likely to make class gifts that arguably would be intended to include
adopteds out. On the other hand, if the clause has meaning, it creates a canon of construction
that arguably limits freedom of testation - a creator could not expressly provide that class gifts
should not benefit adopteds out - which makes the operative verb "shall not affect" ill-chosen.
46. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 373, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
47. If the adopted out could be "virtually represented" by a person whose identity was
known for the purposes of Surrogate's Court and Procedure Act [hereinafter "SCPA"] § 315
(McKinney 1988), then the adopted out would not be a necessary party. For example, if a gift
were given "to A for life and on A's death to A's issue then living," and A had one child, B,
whose child C, was adopted away, although C would be "issue" of A pursuant to Surrogate
Judge Brewster's view, it is probable that B would be permitted to "virtually represent" C.
SCPA § 315(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 1988). It is assumed that the informational disclosure required by SCPA §§ 315(7) and 304(3) would not hinder virtual representation in the given
instance. However, virtual representation was not available in the Best situation for Mrs. Reid
had the present income interest, and her issue - arguably including the adopted out - had a
future interest. So while section 315 can be of use in instances where the adopted out has a
remainder contingent on the predecease of his or her parent, it does not resolve the problem to
fiduciaries posed by Surrogate Judge Brewster's interpretation in a "garden variety" case.
48. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 374-75, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
49. Id. at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
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surrounds adoptions through agencies, 5 0 and he urged that the legislature consider appropriate amendment: "To continue the existing
statute without amendment will give rise to litigation, delays in the
settlement of estates and distribution of property to persons not only
1 Although
unknown to a testator but to unintended beneficiaries.""
the appellate division affirmed per curian,52 the court of appeals reversed on the issue of the presumptive inclusion of adopteds out in
53
gifts of "issue" and similar classes.
The court of appeals agreed with the surrogate that his conclusion would conflict with "powerful policy considerations"- the confidentiality of adoption decrees and the finality of judgments of descent.5 " Accordingly, the court chose to read DRL § 117 in a fashion
contrary to the surrogate.
Only if a child adopted out of the family is specifically named in a
biological ancestor's will, or the gift is expressly made to issue including those adopted out of the family, can the child take. In
short, Domestic Relations Law § 117 does not mandate that such a
child receive a gift by implication. 5
The court limited this conclusion-that there was a presumption
that an adopted out should be excluded from a class gift to "issue"
-to cases of adoption by strangers to the biological family. The
court saw adoptions within the family tree, which it termed "hybrid
adoptions," as involving possibly different considerations.5
II.

STATUTORY AMENDMENTS

As Best worked its way through the appellate process, the New
York Law Revision Commission considered the problem of hybrid
50. Id. at 375, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94.
51. Id. (emphasis added). It is a canon of legislative interpretation that a court in construing legislation should assume the legislature intended its legislation to be reasonable. On
the other hand, Surrogate Brewster clearly wanted to emphasize, either for higher courts or
the Law Revision Commission, the very real problems he faced with this statute. See supra
note 45.
52. 102 A.D. 2d 660, 477 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep't 1984).
53. Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 485 N.E. 2d 1010, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1985).
54. Id. at 155-56, 485 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 347-48.
55. Id. at 156, 485 N.E.2d at 1013, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
56. In a footnote the court noted:
Different considerations might apply in hybrid cases, such as where a child is
adopted by two descendants in some degree from a biological parent or parents or
by one such person and a spouse who is a total stranger to the family. That question
is not before us and we express no opinion on it.
66 N.Y.2d at 155 n.1, 485 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
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adoption in the twin contexts of intestate rights and construction of
instruments. The classic problem addressed by the Commission was
the death of one parent followed by the remarriage of the survivor
and the adoption of the child or children by the stepparent. This
57
adoption, by operation of DRL, section 117 as it then existed, cut
the adopted child out of the deceased parent's family tree (although
it inserted the child into the adopting stepparent's) for the purposes
of intestacy. Also, the adoption out might well exclude the adoptee
from class gifts made by the deceased parent's family after the fact
of the adoption.58 The Law Revision Commission believed that these
conclusions were not in keeping with the presumed intent of a typical
deceased parent's family.5 9 The legislature enacted the proposed reforms in two parts. The first dealt with class gifts under instruments
in 198660 and the second dealt with intestacy in 1987.61 In a less
classic manner, the adopted out was also possibly disadvantaged
when both parents had died, or when, because of the inability of the
parents to care for the child, the child was adopted not by a stepparent but by a member of a parent's family.
DRL, section 117 now provides that in the case of the construction of instruments executed after the effective date of the amendment, unless the instrument expressly provided to the contrary, an
adopted out child would share in class gifts made by his or her natural grandparents or their descendants if an adoptive parent was:
1) the spouse of the child's natural parent;
2) the child's natural grandparent; or
3) a descendant of such grandparent.
In the same vein, it is provided that in the case of persons dying
intestate after the effective date of the amendment, an adopted out
child would inherit from his or her natural grandparents or their descendants if an adoptive parent was:
1) the spouse of the child's natural parent;
57. It should be recalled that § 117 was quite clear as to the inclusion in the case of
intestacy. The ambiguity which faced the courts in Best arose in the context of construction.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
58. The question, as usual, would be one of intent, either expressed or implied. However,
in the classic case, especially where the instrument was created before the adoption out, it
seems most unlikely that there could be any intention to exclude. In the opinion of Surrogate
Brewster, but not of the court of appeals, DRL § 117 resolved this question in favor of the
adopted out. See supra notes 41-42 & 53 and accompanying text.
59. Leg. Doc. (1986) No. 65 (B) at 35.
60. 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 408.
61. 1987 N.Y. Laws ch. 499.
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2) the child's natural grandparent; or
3) a descendant of such grandparent.6 2
Several years after addressing the problems of adopteds out, the
Law Revision Commission turned its attention to nonmaritals. The
rights of nonmaritals in intestacy were already governed by EPTL,
section 4-1.2, which provides that a nonmarital can inherit from and
through that person's natural mother and from and through that
person's natural father so long as certain prescribed proofs of paternity are met.63 As to the rights of nonmaritals under instruments,
the Law Revision Commission proposed and the legislature enacted
an amendment to EPTL, section 2-1.3:
(a) Unless the creator expresses a contrary intention, a disposition
of property to persons described in any instrument as the issue,
children, descendants, heirs, heirs at law, next of kin, distributees
(or by any term of like import) of the creator or of another, includes ...
(3) Nonmarital children. For the purposes of this paragraph,
a nonmarital child is the child of a mother and is the child of
a father if the child is entitled to inherit from such father
under section 4-1.2 of this chapter. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to the wills of persons dying on and after
September first, nineteen hundred ninety-one, to lifetime instruments theretofore executed which on said date are subject
to the grantor's power to revoke or amend, and to all lifetime
64
instruments executed on or after such date.
Accordingly, after Best and the statutory amendments to DRL,
section 117 and EPTL, section 2-1.3, the law may be summarized as
follows:
A. Express Instruments
1. As to instruments that become irrevocable on or after September 1, 1991 "issue" presumptively includes maternal nonmarital
issue and paternal nonmarital issue under the circumstances set
forth in EPTL, section 4-1.2.
2. As to instruments that become irrevocable before September
1, 1991 "issue" presumptively includes non-marital issue unless the
Best presumption is rebutted or unless the amendment to EPTL, sec62.
that this
adoptive
63.
64.

DRL § 117 (McKinney 1988). The bill used the word "natural" although it is clear
word was intended to mean preadoption relatives and thus include both biological and
kin.
EPTL §4-1.2 (McKinney 1991).
EPTL §2-1.3 (McKinney 1981).
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tion 2-1.3 can be seen as a legislative overruling of Best.
3. "Issue" does not include issue adopted out by strangers.
4. For instruments executed after September 1, 1986 by the
preadoption grandparent of the adopted out or a descendant of a
preadoptive grandparent, "issue" includes adopteds out if the adoptive parent was:
(i) the spouse of the preadoption parent; or
(ii) the preadoptive grandparent or a descendant of such
grandparent.
B. Intestacy
1. "Issue" includes maternal nonmarital issue and paternal nonmarital issue under the circumstances set forth in EPTL, section 41.2.
2. In the case of persons dying intestate after August 31, 1987,
"issue" includes an adopted out if and only if the decedent was a
preadoption grandparent, or a descendent of a preadoption grandparent, and the adoptive parent was:
(i) the spouse of a preadoptive parent; or
(ii) the preadoptive grandparent or a descendent of such
grandparent.
Some examples may be in order. In almost every instance,6 5 an
adopted child is "pasted into" the adoptive family tree and therefore
can take from and through the adoptive parents.6" In most instances,67 an adopted child is removed from the natural family tree,
and, therefore, after the adoption out will no longer be able to take
from and through the natural parents.68 A parent who consents to
adoption of his or her child by his or her spouse does not lose the
existing relationship by reason of this adoption.6 9 In instances where
a child is adopted away by a stepparent or certain relatives and the
intestate is one of certain members of the child's natural family, the
65. For the exceptions, see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
66. DRL § 117(l)(c) (McKinney 1988). An adopted in can inherit as a grandchild of
his or her adoptive mother's and father's parents. Presumptively, an adopted in will share in
gifts under instruments to issue of his or her adoptive mother or father.
67. For the exceptions, see infra notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text.
68. DRL § 117(l)(b) (McKinney 1988). An adopted out will not inherit as a grandchild
of his or her biological mother's and father's parents. Presumptively, an adopted out will not
share in gifts under instruments to issue of his or her biological father or mother.
69. DRL § 117(l)(d) (McKinney 1988). A child adopted by a stepparent with the consent of the parent who is the spouse of the adopting stepparent will inherit as a grandchild
from the consenting parent's parents. Presumptively, such a child will continue to share in gifts
under instruments to issue of the consenting parent.
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child will not be removed from the natural family tree and still will
be able to take through his or her natural parent who may or may
not have consented to the adoption. 70 In most instances," when a
person would take as a member of both the natural and adoptive
family trees because of a combination of the general rule 72 and the

just-noted rule, 73 that person will take only in his or her natural ca-

pacity. 74 The single exception to the rule preventing "double dipping" 75 is when a person would take as a member of both the natural
and adoptive family trees, and the intestate is that person's adoptive
76
parent, that person will take only in his or her adoptive capacity.
III.

LIMITATIONS OF BEST

The general goal of construction is to determine and effectuate
the intentions of the instrument's creator. If this is the sole value to
be furthered by construction, each construction case therefore must
be interpreted sui generis. The word "issue" employed in the Best
will, on its face, is ambiguous as to whether the class it described
included the nonmarital child surrendered for adoption. 77 If the testatrix's intention governs, her will can be construed only with reference to the particular facts of the Best case.
Mrs. Best's daughter had a nonmarital child in 1952.78 Mrs.
70. A child adopted by a stepparent with the consent of the parent who is the spouse of
the adopting stepparent, e.g., after the death of the other natural parent, will inherit as a
grandchild from the parents of the deceased parents. Presumptively, the child will continue to
share in gifts under instruments to issue of the deceased parents, created by certain relatives of
the child.
71. For the exception, see infra note 75-76 and accompanying text.
72. The general rule permits adopteds to take as members of their adoptive families.
73. The rule permits a child adopted by a stepparent to remain in their natural family
trees under certain circumstances.
74. DRL § l17(l)(e) (McKinney 1988). A child adopted after the decease of his parents, e.g., by his paternal grandfather, will inherit after his adoptive parent's death for the
purposes, e.g., of a paternal aunt's intestacy as his adoptive parent's grandchild. Presumptively,
the child will continue to share in gifts under instruments created, in other words, in his natural capacity, by certain relatives of the child to issue of his deceased natural grandparent (and
adoptive parent) as a grandchild. Compare UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (U.L.A.) § 2-114 (gives
the child the larger of the two shares).
75. DRL § l17(l)(e) (McKinney 1988).
76. Id. A child adopted after the decease of his parents, for instance, by his paternal
grandfather, will inherit in his adoptive parent's intestacy as his adoptive parent's (and natural
grandparent) child. Presumptively, the child will share in gifts under instruments created by
his adoptive parent (and natural grandparent) as a child. Compare UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(U.L.A.) § 2-114 (gives the child the larger of the two shares).
77. Best, 66 N.Y.2d at 154, 485 N.E.2d at 1011-12, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 346-47.
78. Id. at 153, 485 N.E. 2d at 1011, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
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Best knewof this child,79 probably advised her daughter to surrender
the child for adoption and certainly assisted her daughter in making
such arrangements." Neither Mrs. Best nor her daughter participated in the raising of this child: they did not see him nor did they
know his whereabouts after the adoption.81 It would seem that Mrs.
Best was uncomfortable with the fact of this child, for she never
mentioned its existence to many members of the family,82 quite possibly to spare the feelings of her daughter, her eventual son-in-law
and their child. Some twenty years later, the drafter of her will, presumably at her instruction, employed the word "issue" to describe a
class of beneficiaries. 3 As Mrs. Best never mentioned the fact of the
nonmarital child to the drafter,8 4 the drafter could not have been
aware of the ambiguity of the word "issue" in describing a class the
drafter thought would be easily defined. In addition, the nonmarital
child was surrendered for adoption shortly after its birth.8 5 Mrs.
Best's daughter (presumably with Mrs. Best's advice and approval,
but certainly with her knowledge88 ) legally severed her relationship
with her child. The question before the several courts in Best, therefore, was whether Mrs. Best intended to include this nonmarital
adopted out child in her gift to her daughter's "issue." It is certainly
possible to conclude that she did not.
The precise facts, which are crucial in determining Mrs. Best's
donative intent, are not easily identified. Facts probably militating
against the inclusion of this child in the class of "issue" for the purposes of the will include: (1) that the child was nonmarital; (2) that
Mrs. Best appeared to feel, because of this child, some sense of
stigma attached to her daughter; (3) that the child was immediately
surrendered for adoption; (4) that the adoption was through an
agency so that the records would be sealed; (5) that the surrender
occurred shortly after birth before any parent-child or grandparentgrandchild bond could form; (6) that neither Mrs. Best nor her
daughter participated in the upbringing of the child; (7) that neither
Mrs. Best nor her daughter was aware of the continued whereabouts
79. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
80. Id.
81. Appellant's Brief at 4.
82. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 374, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
83. Id. at 366, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
84. Affidavit of John F. Brosnan, Esq., Appendix at 152, 153. In fact, she provided the
drafter with a family tree that did not reflect the existence of the nonmarital.
85. Best 1, 116 Misc. 2d at 366, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
86. Affidavit of Andre Ian Cook, Appendix at 156.
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of the child or even his continued existence; (8) that Mrs. Reid did
have subsequent marital issue; (9) that twenty years passed between
the adoption and the drafting of the will; and (10) that Mrs. Best
did not mention the possible existence of the child to the drafter of
her will. A fact militating in favor of the inclusion of the child is
that Mrs. Best knew of the existence of the nonmarital child although she did not acknowledge its existence to the drafter of her
will. As the particular mix of facts present in Best is varied, the
estimate of probable intent changes. It would seem that the more
contact Mrs. Best and Ardith had with the child - for example, if he
had not been surrendered for adoption or if he had been adopted by
a family member and Mrs. Best and Ardith continued to play a role
in his upbringing as "aunts" - the more likely it would have been
that Mrs. Best intended to favor him.
However, although the primary purpose of a construction proceeding is to honor the presumed intention of the creator, it is not
the sole concern. Public policies intrude on construction from a number of directions. Adopted ins are favored in law and, therefore,
there is a statutory presumption that "issue" includes "adopted in"
children." Nonmarital children certainly are not disfavored. Recurrent amendment of the intestacy statutes has made it progressively
easier for nonmarital children to inherit from and through both their
parents in intestacy. 88 Most recently, the legislature has created a
presumption that the word "issue" and like terms when used in instruments should be read to include nonmarital children of the
mother and of the father, as long as the proofs of paternity required
by EPTL, section 4-1.2 are complied with.8 9 Speaking generally, the
sheer number of out-of-wedlock births9" suggests that modern society
considers conception and giving birth out-of-wedlock without the opprobrium attached to those acts by previous generations. 9 1 And to
the extent there still is social disapproval, it surely should attach to
87. EPTL § 2-1.3 (McKinney 1981).
88. See In re Hoffman, 53 A.D.2d 55, 57-63, 385 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53-54 (1st Dep't 1976).
For the most recent development in this line of enactments, see EPTL § 4-1.2 (McKinney
Supp. 1991).
89. EPTL § 2-1.3(a)(3) (McKinney 1981).
90. In 1984, 27.1% of births in New York State were out of wedlock. N.Y. Times, Mar.
24, 1986, § B, at 8, col. 1. It is estimated that more than half of 1986 births given by young
women aged 15 to 19 years in the United States will be out of wedlock; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1986, § C, at 18, col. 4.
91. The court of appeals in Best noted that "contemporary social mores" suggested that
drafters would not expect "issue" to be construed in a manner discriminatory to nonmaritals.
66 N.Y.2d 151, 154, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1012, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (1985).
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the parents and not to the child.
There seems to be little question that the court of appeals and
the legislature were correct to create a presumption that nonmaritals
should be included within "issue" to the extent that the word to be
construed referred to "issue" of the custodial parent or parents. Such
a limited presumption would arise from presumed intent. If a creator
wishes to favor the children of A, it seems likely that the creator
wishes to favor those to whom A acts as a parent. In view of changes
in social mores, it seems unlikely that the marital or nonmarital status of a child would matter, and, if it did, the creator could make
this distinction expressly. However, if a creator wishes to favor the
children of A, it seems less likely that the creator wishes to favor
those biological issue of A, whom A does not see or know. In Best,92
the court did not expressly distinguish between nonmarital issue of
custodial as opposed to noncustodial parents. 93 This lack of distinction would seem to indicate its decision was based less on presumed
intent and more on a policy of nondiscrimination: the marital or
nonmarital status of a child does not attach from any act on the
child's part. Therefore, the law should support equal treatment for
nonmaritals, barring actual evidence that a contrary intent was intended. The legislature followed the court's lead and indeed extended
it, requiring not only that there be a rebuttable presumption in favor
of inclusion, but also that the rebutting of this presumption could
only be effected by express provision in the instrument.
This broader treatment can be defended because the presumption will yield to an express provision to the contrary. However, the
fact that the presumption is so broad may defeat the presumed desire on the part of the court and the legislature to promote the rights
of nonmaritals. Drafters now routinely will raise in the abstract the
question of inclusion or exclusion of nonmaritals. A creator, faced
with an abstract question, may opt for exclusion of a nonmarital out
of a desire for what passes for propriety. However, faced with the
actuality of a long standing "regular-irregular" relationship or a single parent situation, the creator might well be inclined towards inclusion. By compelling action, the Best decision and the amendment
to EPTL, section 2-1.3 may, in fact, promote injustice.
Privacy of persons is a second public policy addressed by the
courts. In cases of nonmaritals not surrendered for adoption, this
92.
93.

66 N.Y.2d 151, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345.
Id.
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value is of minor importance with regard to the custodial parent or
parents. Construing gifts to that parent's "issue" to include the
nonmarital child would not make public that which was private. On
the contrary, by allowing the nonmarital child to take along with
marital siblings, discrimination reflecting an archaic and unfair
prejudice (of which the child might be painfully aware) can be limited. However, in the case of the noncustodial parent the situation is
somewhat different. If gifts to that person's "issue" are to be construed as including a nonmarital child, it would seem that that person will have to inform his or her family of the fact of that child, so
that relations can expressly define the beneficiaries of their potential
gifts. This the parent may be loathe to do, as it may require a confession of sexual irresponsibility and perhaps adultery. So creators
working in ignorance of the actual facts, must choose blanket inclusion or exclusion. Also, in the case of instruments which are irrevocable, such a construction puts the interests of the nonmarital child
at odds with those of the marital children. The noncustodial parent
will almost certainly play a greater role in the upbringing of his or
her marital children and may well feel a closer bond with them.
These concerns may lead a noncustodial (male) parent to deny the
paternity of the nonmarital or otherwise to attempt to evade responsibilities, both emotional and financial, owed the nonmarital child.
Ease of administration and judicial economy is a third public
policy to be considered. Proof of paternity of nonmarital children can
be burdensome. In the case of intestacy, the legislature has mandated mechanisms by which paternity may be acknowledged or
proved, 94 and these standards of proof are incorporated by reference
into EPTL, section 2-1.3. However, there is no requirement as to
when proof of paternity must be made.9 5 Therefore, because unknown but possible nonmarital children are necessary parties to an
accounting proceeding, the fiduciaries of such a gift will be denied a
complete discharge. It is possible that a male noncustodial parent
will not know of the existence of the child, which will create
problems of security of title and effective fiduciary discharge. This
concern helped persuade the court of appeals in Best to hold that
94. EPTL § 4-1.2 (a)(2) (McKinney 1981).
95. It seems that paternity can be proved beyond reasonable doubt even if the father is
dead. HANSEN & GURTLER, "TYPING OF A DEAD MAN BY A MICROABSORPTION METHOD:
SOLUTION OF A PATERNITY CASE," 13 ANTIGENS 61 (1979). New York permits paternity to be
shown by a "blood generic marker test" together with other evidence. EPTL § 4-1.2 (a)(2)(D)
(McKinney 1981).
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certain classes of adopteds out should not be presumed to be "issue." ' These problems are severely diminished in the case of a father who provides custodial care. Paternity will be assumed and, if
asserted, probably will not be denied. Furthermore, the fact of the
child will be well known to the father's family and it will be easy to
make such child a party to any proceeding. Accordingly, both as a
matter of presumed intent and from the values underlying the public
polices which touch on the point, the presumption judicially announced and legislatively extended may be overbroad.
The Best court also spoke to the problem of adopted outs. If a
child was surrendered for adoption to strangers, there is a presumption that a gift to his or her parents' "issue" shall not include the
adopted out. The policies noted in connection with nonmarital children have impact on this point as well, but here the decision of the
court of appeals seems more salutary.
First, as to the question of presumed intent, the fact that a child
is surrendered for adoption usually results from the conclusion by
the child's parents or society that the child would be better off in a
new family unit. It seems not unusual that the creator of an interest
- probably a family member of a parent - would concur in this conclusion.9 7 As such, the position of the court of appeals would seem to
be sound as a matter of presumed intent. One possible exception to
this conclusion may arise if the adoption occurs not as a result of
surrender but because the death of both parents. There would be no
grounds to conclude that a creator would wish to disinherit a child
on this basis. However, there are other reasons, discussed below, why
disinheritance even in such instances should in fact result.
It is generally true that adoption is favored in law. 98 However,
this policy finds its effect in the complete (or almost complete) 99 excision of the adopted from his or her natural family and the complete insertion of the child into the adoptive family. Obviously, a presumption that the child should take under a gift to "issue" leaves a
strand connecting the child to his or her preadoptive status. It can be
argued, of course, that the child's economic interest should not suffer
96. An example of such a strike suit was demonstrated in In re Leventritt, where the
mother of the nonmarital intervenor had already agreed that the child was not issue of Mr.
Leventritt as part of a settlement of a previous proceeding. 92 Misc. at 599-600, 400 N.Y.S.2d
at 300.
97. As would appear to have been in the case of Best. See supra text accompanying
notes 78-87.
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying note 12 and notes 65-70.
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for the failings of the natural parents. However, the stronger position
would seem to be that the sociological interest of being a complete
member of the new family should take precedence an over economic
interest. This position seems to be taken by the legislature in its basic formulation of section 117. Furthermore, persons with merely
contingent interests may well be necessary parties in construction or
accounting proceedings. In these instances, the new family unit,
which the law has so carefully constructed, is broken down for what
may produce no real economic interest at all. 100
The right of privacy is allied with this conclusion and also supports the conclusion of the court of appeals. It is obviously important
for the adopted child and the adoptive parents to bond into a new
family unit. To this end there are statutory provisions for the sealing
of adoption records. A presumption that the adopted out should
share in a class gift breaks down the wall of privacy surrounding the
gift, possibly without any economic gain to the child. It is true of
course that the demands of privacy are strongest during the child's
infancy and during that period in which the child's interest would be
represented by a guardian ad litem. However, the proceeding would
disclose the fact of the child and probably would require communication with the adoptive parents. On the other hand, as the court of
appeals noted, if the adoption is not by strangers but by members of
the natural family - a hybrid adoption - the fact of the adoption and
the natural identity of the child will more probably be known and
the importance of the value of privacy accordingly diminished.
Finally, the presumption regarding adopteds out announced by
the court of appeals in Best also promotes judicial economy and ease
of administration. In the case of adoption out by strangers, it is
likely that the records will be sealed 01° and thus the child will be
difficult to locate. Therefore, there is a presumption that the child
need not be found and made a party. In the case of an adoption by
family members, the child is likely to be well known and readily
available, and therefore these values are not so pressing.
100. In Best, for example, the adoptive parents contended that their son has been promised a "substantial legacy" in exchange for his coming forward. With hindsight, they regretted
that they had allowed disclosure of the facts of his birth to occur. A good argument based on
public policy could be made that, where the records have been sealed, a creator should not be
permitted to require that a gift to "issue" should include adopted outs unless the specific
adopted out can be named.
101. See In re Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 485 N.E.2d 1010, 1012, 495 N.Y.S.2d 345,
347 (1985).
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LIMITATIONS OF

DRL,

SECTION

117

AMENDMENT RELATING

TO INSTRUMENT CONSTRUCTION

The Best court acknowledged that its decision should not govern
cases of hybrid adoptions - "where different considerations might apply." 10 By the amendment to DRL, section 117 enacted in 1986, an
"adopted out" will now share in class gifts made by his or her natural grandparents or their descendants, unless the instrument expressly provides to the contrary'0 3 if an adoptive parent was (1) the
spouse of the child's natural parent, (2) the child's natural grandparent or (3) a descendant of such grandparent.1 0 As was stated previously, 10 5 justification for an extension of class gifts was found in the
presumed intent of the creator.1 06 Permitting adopteds out to take
only from natural grandparents or descendants thereof was justified
by the statutory preclusion of inheriting from great-grandparents
and more remote relatives through intestacy.10 7 The inclusion of
adopteds out adopted by a stepparent was not specially justified but,
as this would seem to be the fact pattern where the old law would
generally work the most obvious injustice, perhaps a particular justi-

fication was not thought necessary.
A presumption of the sort created by this amendment to DRL,
section 117 relating to the construction of instruments automatically
raises the question of whether it is too narrow or too broad. It is
possible that the legislature, its attention focused on one sort of situation, failed to recognize that the relief it provided would be appropriate to other situations as well.10 8 Conversely, it is also possible
102. 66 N.Y.S.2d at 155 n.1, 485 N.E.2d at 1012, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
103. There is a problem in the meshing of the Best presumption regarding the exclusion
of adopteds out who were adopted out by strangers and the DRL § 117 presumption regarding
the inclusion of adopteds out who were adopted by certain family members. Best states that
there is a rebuttable presumption that adopteds out by strangers should be excluded but does
not explain what sort of evidence will work a rebuttal. DRL §117 states that adopteds out will
not be included unless the instrument expressly provides to the contrary or the adoption out is
by certain family members. Thus, the statute seems to amend the Best conclusion in the case
of adopteds out by strangers and make their exclusion more definite.
104. DRL § 117 (McKinney 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 60-76.
105. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
106. However, no empirical studies were made on this point.
107. Leg. Doc. (1985) No. 65 [N] at 25. The statute governing intestate succession is
EPTL § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981). Compare EPTL § 4-1.1 (a)(8) (to grandparents or issue of
grandparents) with EPTL § 4-1.1(a) (9) (McKinney 1981) (to great-grandparents or issue of
great-grandparents but only if "the decedent was at the time of his death an infant or an
adjudged incompetent.").
108. This creates, on the common law side, problems, beloved by legal method students,
of "coordination" with the statutory enactment.
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that the legislature, convinced that the relief is appropriate in one
sort of situation, failed to consider that the relief as enacted will, on
its face at least, apply to situations where it is not appropriate. DRL,
section 117, as amended in this respect, would seem to have failings
of both sorts.
First, it is clear that in the classic case - death of a parent followed by adoption by a stepparent - the amendment does a great
deal of good. It seems unlikely that a creator, intending to benefit
A's issue, would wish to limit the gift of A's issue in the case of (1)
A's death, (2) A's spouse's remarriage, and (3) the adoption of A's
issue by the second spouse. So, if A himself is the creator, the statute
preserves the gift to A's children.109 Similarly, if the gift was created
by a parent of A for A and A's issue,"' the statute would preserve
the gift for the creator's grandchildren. However, again in the classic
case (death of a parent followed by adoption by a stepparent), the
restriction of the relief to instruments created by grandparents of the
adopteds out and descendants of said grandparents seems unduly
narrow. If the gift to A's issue is created by A's grandparents, "1 it
would seem just as probable as in the cases of gifts by A or A's
parents that the class of beneficiaries should not change because of
A's death, A's spouse's remarriage and adoption of A's issue by their
stepparent. Further, in this last pattern, the problem caused by adoption out is particularly pernicious because adoption by a stepparent
after a parent's death usually occurs when the parent dies prematurely. Therefore, it is likely that A's parents will be alive at the
death of A, the remarriage of A's spouse and the adoption of A's
children by their stepparent, and that gifts made by A's parents
therefore can usually express their actual intent as to inclusion or
exclusion. However, gifts by A's grandparents are likely to be fixed
by such times by the deaths of their creators. So it would seem that
the legislature carefully limited the remedial presumption to exclude
those cases where it was most needed.
The classic case can also cause difficulties in the case of instru109. A typical gift of this sort would be by A to A's spouse for life, remainder to A's
issue alive at the death of A's spouse. Under the old law, without specific drafting, adoption of
A's issue by A's spouse's second spouse would arguably (the issue would be one of intent)
exclude the adopted out children. This possibility might put an economic roadblock in the way
of the best (social) interests of the child which would clearly be unsatisfactory.
110. A typical gift of this sort would be by A's parents, to A for life, to A's spouse for
life, remainder to A's issue alive at the death of the survivor of A and A's spouse.
11.
A typical gift of this sort would be by A's grandparent to A's parent for life, remainder to A or, if A does not survive that parent, to A's then living issue.
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ments created by ancestors more remote than great grandparents of
the adopted out, but the operation of the Rule against perpetuities
makes such gifts rather rare. " 2 However, other fact patterns-excluded from the benefit of the statutory presumption-need
to be examined. First, the premise of the statute in the context of the
classic case is that a creator, who chooses to make a gift to A's issue,
would not wish the objects of his or her bounty to vary because of
A's death, A's spouse's remarriage and the adoption of A's children
by the stepparent. But if this is so, why does it matter whether the
creator is related to the adopted out at all? It is true that gifts by
friends are less typical than gifts by family members, but, if a gift is
made to A's issue, surely the presumed intent to include adopteds
out adopted by a stepparent is equally valid for both biologically related and biologically unrelated creators. Second, if the posited premise is correct, the presumption should be equally valid if the second
natural parent dies and the child is adopted by the second spouse of
the initial adoptive parent.11 3 And going somewhat beyond the classic case, if a gift is made to A's issue, and A dies and A's children
are thereafter adopted, is it likely that a creator's intention to favor
A's children will vary with the identity of the adoptive parent? It is
true that where the adoption records are sealed there are
countervalues of privacy, judicial economy and ease of administration which may outweigh presumed intent. However, when the facts
of the adoption are known, and these counter values cannot be
served, a broader presumption in favor of inclusion than that provided by DRL, section 117 is warranted.
As the amendment of DRL, section 117 is arguably too narrow
in the aspects just discussed, it can be argued that in other matters it
speaks too broadly. The amendment protects the interests of
adopteds out in the case of instruments created by grandparents and
their descendants. In instances where the death of the adopted out's
parent is followed by remarriage of the surviving spouse and adoption by a stepparent, this result seems sound in the case of instruments created by grandparents, uncles and aunts. They would continue to see the adopted out as part of their family tree, as they
almost certainly would have known the adopted out's deceased par112. The New York rule on remoteness of vesting (which now parallels the common law
rule) is codified at EPTL § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1981).
113. If it is contended that this eventuality - both natural parents dying - is so rare that
it can be disregarded, why then does DRL §117(l)(d) (McKinney 1988) seemingly speak to it
in the area of parental duty, as well as in other instances discussed above?
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ent. Also their instruments might well be irrevocable at the time of
the adoption out, thus precluding the possibility of express inclusion
or exclusion. However, when instruments created by first cousins or
first cousins once removed are considered, these rationales begin to
break down. It is likely that a creator will give a contingent remainder to the issue of his or her grandparents. It is possible that a creator, given a sparse family tree, might make this ultimate gift114 to
the issue of his or her great grandparents. But in the instance of first
cousins of the adopted out or, more clearly, in the case of first cousins once removed, 115 it is less likely that they would consider the
adopted out as part of their family tree. They may not have known
the adopted out's deceased parent (their uncle or aunt or great-uncle
or great-aunt); they may not know of the existence of the adopted
out. Also, as their instruments will most likely be created after the
fact of the death of the adopted out's parent or the adoption itself,
their instruments can (and should, if the facts are known) address
the situation expressly.
A second area where this amendment to DRL, section 117 may
paint too broadly is in cases-where the adopted out is a nonmarital
child or where the adoption out is in the aftermath, not of death, but
of divorce. For reasons discussed above,"' it is not as easy to include
nonmarital children in class gifts made by the family of the noncustodial natural parent as it is to include them in class gifts made by
the family of the custodial natural parent. Where the child is.
adopted by the spouse of the custodial natural parent, the arguments
for exclusion for the purposes of instruments created by persons in
the noncustodial parent's family tree are strengthened. As the natural parents have decided that the child should be part of the custodial parent's family, it seems more likely than not that the family of
the noncustodial parent would accept this decision for the purposes
of the construction of their instruments. After all, in this sort of situation, the family of the noncustodial parent might not know of the
child. Furthermore, a contrary conclusion, that the child should remain within the family tree of the noncustodial parent, may disrupt
114. Or more properly a penultimate gift over, for it is prudent, especially given a sparsity of family members, to make an ultimate gift over to charity which provides the additional
protections against escheat of possible infinite duration of the beneficiary and cy pres.
115. Because of typical mortality, barring a family tree with exceptional age differentials within a generation, it is unlikely that a person would take under instruments created by
more remote kin.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.

1990]

BEST FRIENDS AND RELATIONS

the adoptive and actual family grouping by tending to reveal what
might otherwise have been appropriately concealed and by possibly
putting the child in a different economic posture than his or her siblings with resultant disharmony.
Similar sorts of problems can exist if the adoption out follows a
divorce, especially a divorce filled with acrimony. Obviously, the divorce itself does not affect the status of the issue of the marriage as a
matter of family law. However, the resolution of the custody issue,
both in law and in fact, may have a bearing on whether the noncustodial parent and the family of the noncustodial parent consider the
child as a continuing part of the family for the purpose of the construction of instruments. Again, the arguments in favor of excluding
the child from the noncustodial parent's family are strengthened by
adoption of the child by the second spouse of the custodial parent.
It is not easy to say that the conclusions on these points enacted
by the legislature are wrong. It is easier to say that these conclusions
were reached by considering the most halcyon of fact patterns where
the nonmarital or adopted out child remains in the bosom of his or
her natural family surrounded by an aura of love. However, the legislation was drafted, proposed and enacted without any reported demographic data regarding how human beings regard their natural
kin who are adopted away in the myriad of human circumstances in
which such events may occur. Further, if these conclusions in the
area of instrument construction are reached as a matter of public
policy to favor nonmarital and adopted out issue, it is important to
recognize that these public policies are being allowed to override the
more general policy in favor of freedom of testation. It may be that
this is appropriate, but the weighing process should be a long
thoughtful one and the resolution not overbroad.
Fault can also be found with the method employed to effectuate
these reforms. The statute requires that an instrument expressly contradict the mandated presumption: no other proof of a contrary intention will carry the day. Certainly the requirement of express precision is aimed at judicial economy by limiting the number of
construction proceedings. However, this requirement accepts as its
price a certain number of unjust results. Were the courts beforehand
clogged with this sort of construction case? Further, because of the
reform, the matter will now be routinely addressed by drafters. This
will lead to the development of boiler-plate which, when matched
with unexpected facts, may still require construction. Finally, drafters faced with dealing with all possible family situations may ex-
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pressly overcome the legislative presumption and deliberately reintroduce ambiguity, preferring to trust the discretion of a trial judge
rather than their own prescience to resolve confusing fact patterns.
V.

LIMITATIONS OF

DRL, SECTION 117 AMENDMENT RELATING
TO INTESTACY

DRL, section 117 was also amended with respect to the rights
of adopteds out in intestacy. Under prior law, an adopted out lost all
right to inherit in intestacy from and through his or her natural parents with the sole and reasonable exception that a child adopted by
the spouse of a natural parent continued to be part of that living
parent's family tree for purposes of intestacy. 117 However, the exclusion of the adopted out from the family tree of the other parent for
the purposes of intestacy-especially when the adoption out follows
the death of that parent-was felt to be unfair and not in keeping
with the presumed intent of members of the family of the deceased
parent. Accordingly, DRL, section 117 now provides that adopteds
out will not lose their rights to inherit from and through either parent if:
(1)the decedent is the adoptive child's natural grandparent or is the
descendant of such grandparent, and
(2)an adoptive parent
(i) is married to the child's natural parent, or
(ii) is the child's natural grandparent, or
(iii) is descended from such grandparent, and the decedent is the child's natural grandparent or a descendant of
such grandparent.""
As was the case with the amendment regarding the construction
of instruments, it must be considered whether the line enacted by the
legislature is properly placed or whether its rule is excessively exclusive or inclusive. Would a presumed "average" intestate wish a
broader class of adopteds out than that now protected by the amendment to share as issue? Conversely, would this presumed average
intestate wish to exclude all or part of a class now included by the
statute?
On the side of excessive exclusivity, as the intestacy laws gener117. DRL §117 (McKinney 1988). So, for example, if C is the child of H and W, and C
is eventually adopted by a subsequent spouse of W, the parent-child relationship for the purposes of intestacy between H and C is severed, but the parent-child relationship between W
and C is not.
118. DRL § I17(1)(e) (in part).
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ally preclude inheritance from ancestors more remote than grandparents of their descendants, " 9 any improper omission would result
from those laws and not from the present amendment to DRL, section 117. But, on the side of inclusivity, the same sort of difficulties
faced in the context of construction of instruments 2 ' must be considered. For the classic case, death of a parent followed by the remarriage of the surviving parent and adoption out by a stepparent, the
proposed amendment seems basically salutary. It may be that the
second marriage and the adoption out are accompanied by a de facto
termination of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. But if that is
so, the deserted grandparent might well be induced by the fact of the
termination to consult a lawyer and make a will. More pernicious, it
seems, is the reverse situation where the grandparents continue a
close relationship with their deceased child's spouse and their
grandchild. Most probably, they would not see a reason to consult a
lawyer in the happy events of the remarriage and "adoption out."
Thus, without the present amendment, the adopted out grandchild
would lose rights in intestacy which his or her grandparents may
well have assumed remained in place.
Beyond the classic case the amendment seems less benign.
Where the adoption is by a family member, for instance, the child's
maternal grandparents and not a stepparent, it would seem likely
that the paternal relatives would assume such act severed their legal
relationship with the child. This situation might well involve a
nonmarital child whose parents are unable to undertake its upbringing due to their youth or other disability. In these circumstances, it
is not unlikely that subsequent inter-family relations will not be
cordial.
Further problems with the amendment center around adoptions
out that follow divorce. The divorce severs the relationship between
the husband and wife. Subsequent adoption, to many minds, severs
the relationship between a parent and the child. It may be in the
best interests of the child to be brought up as part of the new familial unit to the exclusion of the parent who permits the adoption out.
In instances where the grandparents' child surrenders the grandchild, it seems likely that the grandparents, because of the fact of
the surrender, would no longer see that grandchild as part of the
family tree. So it may be that the new amendment does exceed an
119.
120.

EPTL § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
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estimate of what the "average" intestate decedent would want or
expect.
A peculiarity with the amendment is the differentiation of the
right of the adopted out to inherit from his natural family and the
right of the natural family to inherit from the adopted out. As has
been noted, the amendment allows the adopted out to inherit from
the natural family without regard to the means by which the parentchild relationship was severed, but it allows inheritance by the natural family only if the natural parent has died without the relationship of parent and child having been terminated previously. The
mere existence of this differentiation is significant because the laws
that govern intestacy are otherwise almost entirely a "two way"
street."' One notable exception is the fact that a "bad" parent-a
parent who abandons or fails to support his or her minor children-cannot inherit from such a child while the child's right to take
from the parent remains intact.'2 2 In the case of adopteds out, it
would seem that, in the eyes of the legislature, the act of the parent
permitting the child to be adopted out of his rights is tantamount to
"abandonment." This "bad" act taints the rights not only of the surrendering parent to take in intestacy but of that parent's entire family. With respect to the parent, the distinction may be a reasonable
one. Permitting the child to be adopted will usually bring the parent
in contact with a lawyer, and it can be hoped that through that relationship post adoption inheritance rights will be specifically addressed. The surrendering parent may or may not see the adopted
out as an appropriate heir, and there seems little value in skewing
the presumption against the child. In the case of inheritance from
the child, it seems proper that the adoptive parents who are legally
responsible for the child should get the first call on the child's assets.
However, with respect to the surrendering parent's family, the distinction is less reasonable. This parent is less likely to have dealings
with the lawyer because of the adoption. She may or may not feel
that the adoption out severs her legal relationship with that child.
But if it is concluded that such persons, on average, would feel that
the relationship continues, and the adopted out should share in that
family's intestacies, why should they not be able to receive from the
adopted out as well? In any event, the distinction is anomalous and
deserves greater justification.
121.
122.

See generally EPTL § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
EPTL § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1981).
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There is, of course, a fundamental and important difference between the construction of instruments and intestacy. Instruments are
almost inevitably drafted by lawyers and thus, so long as changes in
rules of construction are made prospectively, lawyers should be able
to contend with virtually any twist on language imposed by the legislature. However, intestacy, almost by definition, rarely involves lawyers. Here the legislature must proceed with extreme caution and
not impose apparently attractive theoretical conclusions without being quite certain they are also founded in reality because, in most
instances, they will not be undone. It is easy to have sympathy for
the adopted out. But it is also easy to forget the rights of the adopted
out do not exist in a vacuum. If the adopted out is to share with
other issue, this will reduce the inheritance of, for instance, the
spouse and children of the intestate or grandchildren who were not
surrendered for adoption. The adopted out will take to the exclusion
of the intestate's parents or brothers and sisters. Perhaps this is what
the typical intestate would want in such circumstances. Perhaps not.
But, in any event, the amendment goes a long way.
VI.

CRITICISM OF THE GENERAL SOLUTIONS ENACTED AS

REFORMS

In both of the two areas under consideration-instrument construction and intestacy-the most important inquiry involves intent:
the actual intent of the creator of an instrument, if such can be discerned, or if no intent can be discerned and in the case of intestacy,
presumed intent. Society approves wholeheartedly of adoption, and
there seems little question that adopted children should be imported
into their new families for the purposes of both instrument construction and intestacy. If a contrary result is desired, the solution is the
expression of that desire in the instrument of transfer. Nonmaritals
may present a somewhat harder problem but, in the case of intestacy, and in the case of instrument construction, the legislature has
resolved matters in favor of inclusion. In the case of a custodial parent, this inclusion seems sound. In the case of a noncustodial parent,
particularly for construction purposes, it can be seen as open to attack. Adopteds out cause the greatest problems, as have been discussed above, and dividing lines-basically including persons
adopted out by stepparents, grandparents or their descendants and
excluding other adopteds out-have been accepted by the legislature
both for instrument construction and intestacy. It has already been
considered whether these lines fall in the right place. However, it can
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be contended that, as to both nonmaritals and adopteds out, drawing
a line or, at least, dealing with these classes as broadly as done previously, is not the proper solution at all.
The court of appeals in Best certainly reached the right conclusion on the facts of the case. For reasons of presumed intent but also
for reasons of privacy and ease of administration, the nonmarital
adopted out child should not be construed as a member of the class
of "issue." The court's reasoning on the impact of the adoption out
was sound as was its distinction between adoption out by strangers
and hybrid adoption. The court did not need -to go beyond this conclusion and beyond this reasoning.
The Best case, however, spurred the legislature to mandate that
nonmaritals are to be included within gifts to "issue" unless specifically excluded. This conclusion certainly is more right than wrong.
The world has changed and, both as a matter of presumed intent and
as an expression of public policy against discrimination, nonmaritals
should generally be included. However, presumed intent does not involve every fact pattern involving a nonmarital nor does public policy
require inclusion in every instance. So, perhaps the legislature spoke
too broadly.
However, this new presumption works to present injustice that
is not remedied easily. Drafters and planners now must face the presumptions in favor of inclusion of nonmaritals and in favor of exclusion of adopteds out. If actual fact patterns exist, are known and are
divulged to the drafters, they can be easily resolved in accordance
with the creator's wishes. However, where specific drafting is not
possible, drafters should be careful not to draw an abstract line
where it will work injustice. This is not an easy task.
The legislature was correct in its belief that the state of DRL,
section 117, prior to its amendments, was flawed. A child adopted
by, for instance, a stepfather, lost all rights to inherit through intestacy from the child's natural father and the natural father's family.
A similar adoption might well jeopariize the rights of that child
under instruments created by the natural father and the natural father's family. Generally speaking, when the father-child relationship
terminated through death, these were not unreasonable results. However, in correcting these flaws, the legislature made two errors.
First, they drafted too broadly. It is not that, in instances beyond the classic case, the results mandated by the legislature are
universally wrong: in many instances they are right. But in many,
perhaps most, instances they go in the wrong direction. Second, by
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requiring express intrinsic contradiction of their presumptions regarding instrument construction and by imposing positive statutory
law in intestacy, the legislature preempted the authority of the
courts to "tailor" the law to specific facts. This was not necessary.
For example, in the case of intestate rights of nonmaritals, the legislature has included them in their maternal family trees in all events
and in their paternal family trees if certain proofs of paternity have
been established. In this way, the rights of nonmaritals are balanced
with the needs of judicial administration to limit litigation, especially
litigation entered into based on scanty evidence and primarily pursued to provoke a settlement offer. However, even in drawing this
line, the legislature recognized that there were situations where the
fact of the line would work substantial injustice. So EPTL 4-1.2
(a)(2)(c) allows a nonmarital to take in intestacy by and through his
or her father if "paternity has been established by clear and convincing evidence and the father of the child has openly and notoriously
acknowledged the child as his own. '"123 This, of course, provides a
court with a range of discretion which can be exercised to prevent
injustice in the case of the child of a "regular-irregular" relationship
and to silence strike suits at least at an early stage. However, in the
case of adopteds out, the recent statutory enactments do not allow
any means of escape from unjust results; much of the human relations surrounding a particular adoption out may militate in favor of
a conclusion contrary to that mandated by the general rules. In the
"classic case," this may be proper, or so usually proper so as not to
merit any exception. However, in the other instances seemingly covered by the act, it would be more reasonable to allow a judge more
freedom to determine inclusion or exclusion on the totality of the
circumstances. It is true that there would be a price to be paid in
terms of the expenditure of judicial resources, but this could be reduced by limiting presumptions to cases where there is no convincing
evidence, intrinsic or extrinsic, that would require a contrary results.
As an alternative, the legislature could also give guidance to the
courts by providing a series of factors to be considered in reaching a
conclusion one way or the other. 2 At the least, more flexibility
123. EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(2)(c) (McKinney 1981).
124. An admittedly incomplete list of such factors might include:
1)knowledge of child by creator/intestate;
2) knowledge of child by that parent who is the creator/intestate's relative;
3) participation of creator/intestate in upbringing of child;
4) participation of that parent who is the creator/intestate's relative in upbringing
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should be provided in the intestacy area where it is unlikely that the
legislatively imposed results will ever be consciously considered by a
prospective intestate.
It is true that a flexible approach causes just as much difficulty
as the enacted conclusions do to fiduciaries seeking a discharge.
What is also needed, regardless of whether the rigid rules remain in
place, is the provision of full protection for fiduciaries who account
in ignorance of the existence of nonmaritals or adopteds out or,. with
knowledge of the existence of an adopted out, but in instances where
the records of the adoption are sealed. If the existence of possibly
interested persons was concealed for reasons of fraud, of course remedies exist against the concealers. If the existence of possibly interested persons was concealed for reasons of privacy, the balancing of
the rights of those involved is more difficult but, certainly, fiduciaries
acting in good faith without knowledge should be protected in their
discharge.
Human relationships are complex. They will not be made simple
by legislative enactment. There was some injustice in the law prior
to Best and the amendments to DRL, section 117. It could have been
cured by limited enactments from which judges could extrapolate in
appropriate circumstances. However, the imposition of broad conceptual solutions increases the risk of injustice. At the same time, the
approach taken by the legislature preempts the ability of judges to
do justice in the particular case before them.

of child;
5) age of child when adopted out; and
6) circumstances surrounding the fact of adoption out.

